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Brain Drain and its Determinants: 
A Major Issue for Small States
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This paper examines the relationship between the brain drain and country size, as well as the 
extent of small states’ overall loss of human capital. We find that small states are the main 
losers because they i) lose a larger proportion of their skilled labor force and ii) exhibit 
stronger reactions to standard push factors. We also observe that the correlation between 
human capital indicators and country size is close to zero. This suggests that small states are 
more successful in producing skilled natives and less successful in retaining them. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  F22, J24, J61, O15 
  








1818 H Street NW 
Washington, DC 20433 
USA 
E-mail: mschiff@worldbank.org     
 
                
 
                                                 
* This paper is a product of the Economic Policy and Debt Department of the World Bank, which 
launched a Research Program on Economic Growth and Integration of Small States to the World 
Economy (World Bank contract PO.0007674813). It was presented at the World Bank Conference on 
“Small States, Growth Challenges and Development Solutions”, Washington, 7-8 December 2007. We 
thank David McKenzie and Edgardo Favaro for their comments. The views presented here are those 
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank, its Executive Directors or the 
governments they represent. INTRODUCTION 
Source countries have been faced with a rising tide of skilled labor emigration in 
recent years, a contributing factor being the increasing skilled labor bias in host countries’ 
immigration policies. This issue is particularly acute in small developing countries. Given the 
importance of human capital in the growth process (Lucas 1988), a substantial brain drain 
might seriously hamper the development of countries affected by it.  
This paper examines various empirical models of skilled emigration rates and assesses 
the specific role of country size. Section 1 defines the concept of “small states” used in our 
empirical analysis, describes some of their characteristics, and provides evidence on the brain 
drain. Section 3 presents the empirical model and results. Section 4 concludes. 
1.  SMALL STATES 
Section 1.1 provides a definition of “small states” and some of their characteristics, 
and Section 1.2 presents brain drain figures for small states and other countries.     
1.1. DEFINITION 
There is no special significance in the selection of a particular population threshold to 
define small states. Indeed, the Commonwealth, in its work on small states, uses a threshold 
of 1.5 million people, but it also includes larger member countries (Jamaica, Lesotho, 
Namibia and Papua New Guinea) because they share many of the same characteristics of 
smallness. The World Bank Task Force on small states used the same threshold as a 
convenient yardstick for classifying all small states, and only considers sovereign states.  
Using the standard of a population below 1.5 million people in 2000, 45 developing 
countries are small, accounting for nearly one third of the total number of developing 
countries. They are home to 20 million people, less than 0.4 percent of the total population of 
developing countries. They range in size from “micro-states” like Cook Islands, Nauru, Niue, 
  2Palau, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Tuvalu (with fewer than 50,000 people each) to Botswana, 
Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, and Trinidad and Tobago (with more than 1 
million people each).  
The per capita GNP in these countries also ranges widely, from less than $400 in 
several African countries (Comoros, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Sao Tome and 
Principe), to $700-1,300 in such countries as Cape Verde, Guyana, Kiribati, Maldives, 
Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu; to more than $9,000 (The Bahamas, Brunei, Cyprus, Malta, and 
Qatar). There are small states in every geographic region, but most countries fall into three 
main groups: twelve states are in the Caribbean region, fourteen in East Asia and Pacific, and 
twelve in Africa. Of the remaining seven countries, two are in South Asia, two in the Middle 
East, and three in Europe. 
1.2. BRAIN DRAIN 
Brain drain figures are presented in Table 1. These are based on Docquier and 
Marfouk (2006). The table presents skilled and overall emigration rates in 2000, as well as the 
ratio of the former to the latter (the “schooling gap”), for 46 small developing states – defined 
by the UN as states with population below 1.5 million – and for other categories of interest. 
Skilled workers are defined as those with university education.  
Row 1 of Table 1 shows that small developing states experience an extremely high 
level of brain drain (43.2%). In other words, 3 out of every 7 individuals with university 
education live outside their country of origin. This rate is 2.8 times as large as the 15.3% 
overall migration rate.  
[Table 1 about here] 
The table also shows a brain drain for small (all) high-income states of 23% (3.5%) or 
a ratio of 6.5 for small versus all states. The same ratio for small versus all developing 
countries is (43.2 / 7.4) or close to 6. In other words, the impact of country size on the brain 
  3drain seems robust across a wide range of incomes. Moreover, the brain drain for all 
developing countries (7.4%) is over twice that of high-income countries (3.5%) and the 
schooling gap is close to four times as high (4.9% versus 1.3%).           
The region with the highest small-state brain drain (74.9%) is the Caribbean (in “Latin 
America and the Caribbean”), followed by East Asia and Pacific region (mainly the South 
Pacific islands) with a brain drain of 50.8%, and Sub-Saharan Africa is next with 41.7%, with 
several countries over 60%. 
Thus, as far as small states are concerned, three out of four skilled Caribbean 
individuals live outside their country of origin, two out of four in East Asia and Pacific, and 
two out of five in Sub-Saharan Africa. Though Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest brain drain 
among these three regions, its schooling gap is more than double that in East Asia and Pacific 
and over three times that in Latin America and the Caribbean. Sub-Saharan high schooling 
gap is due mainly to the wider income gap with developed countries and the smaller share of 
skilled individuals in the population.  
2.  EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The empirical model is presented in Section 2.1, the definition of the two migration 
rates in Section 2.2, and the definition of the explanatory variables in Section 2.3.  
2.1. MODEL 
To estimate the determinants of the brain drain, we regress the rate of emigration of 
skilled workers on various potential determinants observed in 1990 and 2000. Many economic 
and non-economic factors are likely to explain migrants' decisions. The empirical literature 
puts forward that emigration rates depend on many push factors at origin, pull factors at 
destination, cultural and geographic distance and immigration policies. Our general model is:  
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2 1   (1) 
Let us now describe the variables used in this regression and explain the econometric 
methodology. 
2.2. MIGRATION RATES 
Our analysis relies on the data set developed by Docquier and Marfouk (2006). The 
construction of the database relies on three steps: (i) collecting Census and register 
information on the structure of immigration in all OECD countries; (ii) summing up over 
OECD host countries, enabling us to determine the stock of immigrants from any sending 
country to the OECD area by education level; and (iii) comparing the educational structure of 
emigration to that of the population remaining at home, so as to compute emigration rates by 
educational attainment in 1990 and 2000
1. The emigration "rate" of skill     (l = low, h 
= high) from country i at time t is defined as the ratio of emigrants (
h l s , =
s
it EM , ) to natives or the 
sum of residents (
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Counting all foreign born individuals as immigrants independently of their age at 
arrival, the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) database does not account for where the education 
took place.
2 Beine et al.(2006) consider the emigration of skilled natives who obtained their 
university degree in their country of origin. They use the immigrants' age of entry as a proxy 
for where education was acquired. Our regressions also use a definition of the brain drain that 
excludes people who migrated before age 22 (i.e., it excludes those who obtained or 
completed their tertiary degree abroad). 
  5Our emigration rates are based on the 1990 and 2000 stocks, and thus refer to past and 
recent migration decisions. Consequently, we use long-run averages for the explanatory 
variables when available 
2.3. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Many economic and non-economic factors are likely to explain migrants' destination 
choices. The empirical literature puts forth that emigration rates depend on many push factors 
at origin, pull factor at destination, distances (cultural and geographic) and immigration 
policies. To explain aggregate emigration rates, we use the following controls: 
GDP per capita and its squared value ( ) of the source country are used. 
The neoclassical model of migration predicts that a rise in GDP per capita in the country of 
origin reduces the incentive to emigrate. However, as shown by Lopez and Schiff (1998) and 
Rotte and Vogler (2000), economic growth in developing countries might lead to more 
migration because of a relaxation of financial restrictions, even if income differentials to 
destination countries decrease. Introducing the square of GDP per capita allows us to capture 
such effects. We use the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2005b) and compute 
the 1975-2000 average GDP per capita level. 
2 , i i GDP GDP
Geographical distance between countries of origin and destination raise migration 
costs. The variable used is the log of distance to the closest OECD country ( ), measured 
in kilometers. It comes from the CEPII data set which is based on population-weighted 
bilateral distances between the biggest cities at origin and destination (see Clair et al., 2004). 
i DIST
Colonial links tend to lower the cultural distance between host countries and their 
former colonies, including superior knowledge and information on the destination country, 
resulting in lower migration costs. In order to capture this effect, we use a dummy variable 
  6( ) which equals 1 if the origin country had a colonial relationship with an OECD 
country. We use the CIA World Factbook to build this dummy variable. 
i COL
Linguistic proximity clearly favors the exchange of labor between countries. Skills 
acquired prior to migration are not equally transferable to all potential host countries. The 
return to foreign human capital is higher in countries sharing the same language or having the 
same education system. The literature on migrants' assimilation reveals that migrants obtain a 
substantial return for their language capacity, especially skilled migrants. Chiswick and Miller 
(2002, 2004) found a strong correlation between language skill and immigrants’ earnings. We 
construct a dummy variable ( ) equal to one when the origin country shares a common 
language with countries where economic immigration programs are quantitatively important 
(USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand).  
i LING
We also control for ethnic diversity in origin countries by using religious, linguistic 
and ethnic fractionalization indicators ( ). Such fractionalization may impact the 
psychic costs of migration (relative to non-migration) and affect the desire of people to leave 
their country. This is especially true in developing countries where fractionalization often 
gives rise to ethnic or religious conflicts. Our data are taken from Alesina and al. (2003). 
i FRAC
The  socio-political environment at origin ( ) also acts as a push factor. The 
measures used come from two data sets on governance and economic freedom. Data on 
governance are given in Kaufmann et al. (2003) for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004. From 
the six available indicators, we use “political stability and absence of violence” and 
“government effectiveness”. The first indicator measures “perceptions of the likelihood that 
the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional 
and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism”. The second indicator 
measures “quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence 
i POL
  7of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to policies”. Both are normally distributed 
between -2.5 (bad governance) and 2.5 (good governance). For each country, we average the 
scores over the years where they are available. Regarding economic freedom, we use one 
component of the general index published by the Heritage Foundation, namely the indicator 
of property rights available from 1995 to 2005. This variable ranges from 1.0 in countries 
where property rights are well preserved to 4.0 in countries where they are violated. For each 
country, we average all the available scores. 
The size of the country of origin is likely to affect its openness. In our regressions, we 
use the 1975-2000 log of the population size ( ). To capture the specific behavior of 
small countries, we also use additional dummies for small states ( ) (population lower 
than 1.5 million) and subsets of this group. Population data come from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2005). 
i SIZE
i SMS
In alternative regressions, we test for interaction terms  between small states, 
fractionalization and GDP per capita so as to evaluate the specific elasticity of small states’ 
emigration rates to push factors. 
The model described by equation (1) can be estimated using usual panel data 
techniques. Fixed effects estimation that account for unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. different 
i α  across countries) does not make sense here because most of the explanatory variables are 
time invariant. Therefore, we rely on two alternative techniques: (i) random effects estimation 
that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity and allows us to estimate the impact of time 
invariant variables; and (ii) pooled least squares (PLS) that consider no specific constant for 
each country in equation (1). 
 
  83.  RESULTS 
In this paper, we consider the role of country size and smallness in two different ways. 
First, as mentioned previously, we look at the impact of size and smallness on the degree of 
openness. The analysis is carried out for the different types of migration considered here. 
Table 1 looks at the behavior of total migration while Tables 2 and 3 examine, respectively, 
the determinants of the brain drain measured as the proportion of skilled migrants abroad 
(whatever their age at migration), and as the proportion of skilled migrants who left after age 
22 (i.e., after tertiary education). 
Second, we investigate whether and to what extent migrants coming from small 
countries behave differently in terms of their response to religious fractionalization (RF) 
(Table 4) and to GDP capita (Tables 5 and 6).  This is done by introducing interaction terms 
between the “small states” dummy and RF, and between the former and GDP per capita (and 
GDP per capita squared). 
3.1. IMPACT OF SIZE AND SMALLNESS 
We adopt a general-to-specific econometric approach. We first estimate the model 
using panel data estimation with random effects with all potential determinants included in the 
regression. Columns 1 and 2 of Tables 2 to 4 use two different ways to capture smallness of 
countries. Column 1 includes dummies for countries with less than 1.5 million inhabitants and 
countries with more than 40 millions. In Column 2, the classification of small countries is 
further split between countries with less than and more than, 0.5 million inhabitants. Column 
3 presents a parsimonious specification in which the non-significant variables (such as the 
large state dummy) are deleted. Finally, as a robustness check on the use of random effects 
estimates, we estimate the same model using PLS (Column 4). 
  9Tables 2 to 4 present a number of interesting results. First, as expected, an increase in 
the population size reduces total and skilled emigration rates. Second, we find an additional 
role of smallness beyond that of population size. The dummy for small states (in Column 1) 
turns out to be significantly positive for all types of migration examined. We further split this 
dummy (Column 2) and show that this result is in fact driven by the very small states, i.e. 
those with a population below 0.5 million inhabitants. This result is very robust across 
migration types and regression techniques. 
Second, we find the usual inverted-U relationship between migration and GDP per 
capita in origin countries. This result has been found in the literature (e.g., Rotte and Vogler, 
2000, and Mayda, 2006). At low levels, income has a positive impact on the migration rate 
since it alleviates liquidity constraints. As income increases further, the income difference 
with the destination countries falls, which reduces the incentive to migrate
3. This result is 
found for the three migration types. 
Some other determinants also tend to exert significant influence. Violation of property 
rights seems acts as a push factor, especially for total migration. Political instability also acts 
as a push factor, especially for skilled migrants. Government effectiveness seems to favor 
migration, which might seem counterintuitive.
4 Some caution is nevertheless required when 
looking at the results of these three political variables. The reason is that they are strongly 
correlated, which raises the issue of collinearity in the regressions reported in the first two 
columns of Tables 2, 3 and 4. To account for that, we delete two of the three variables in the 
parsimonious regressions. The results show that these variables do not turn out to be robust 
determinants of skilled migration (Tables 3 and 4) though they are significant for the total 
migration rate (Table 2). In contrast, religious fractionalization seems to be a robust 
determinant, though mainly for skilled migration. 
  10Usual variables such as linguistic proximity, distance and colonial links also appear to 
be robust. The significance of the dummy for the year 2000 reflects a moderate but general 
increase in the rates of skilled migration between 1990 and 2000. 
[Tables 2, 3 and 4 about here] 
 
3.2 THE BEHAVIOR OF SMALL STATES’ MIGRANTS  
We now turn to the issue of the specific behavior of small states’ migrants. We address 
this issue by creating interaction variables between the small states dummy (capturing 
countries with less than 1.5 millions inhabitants) and three variables that turn out to be highly 
significant and robust in the previous regressions: (i) religious fractionalization that was found 
to be a push factor for skilled migration; (ii) GDP per capita (in level) capturing the impact of 
liquidity constraints; and (iii) squared GDP per capita capturing the reduced incentive to 
migrate above a given threshold of income. Since these interaction terms are highly correlated 
with each other as well as with the variable small states itself, they are included in separate 
regressions. In other words, joint estimation is not feasible due to the high degrees of 
collinearity between these variables.  The results are shown in Tables 5 to 7. 
Estimates in Table 5 suggest that small states are much more sensitive to religious 
fractionalization (RF). Note that the variable is only significant for skilled migrants while the 
additional impact in small states is significant at the 1% level for both skilled and unskilled 
migrants. As indicated by both the coefficient of RF and of the interaction variable (Rel. Frac. 
x Small), for a given level of fractionalization, people in small states are at least three times 
more willing to migrate than those of other countries.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
  11Estimates of Table 6 provide a similar qualitative picture with respect to GDP per 
capita. That is, as suggested by the negative and significant values of the coefficients of the 
interaction term (GDP per cap x small), small states workers’ migration is more sensitive to 
changes in GDP per capita. This result is quite robust across migration types and across 
estimation techniques, and is consistent with the view that migration costs might be lower in 
small states than in other countries. Nevertheless, the difference in the impact of small states 
and other ones is negligible, ranging from approximately 1% to 2%.  
[Table 6 about here] 
 
As for GDP per capita squared (Table 7), we find that the difference between small 
states and others in terms of the impact of per capita GDP squared is statistically significant, 
with a smaller impact for small states. Once again, though, the difference is small empirically, 
ranging from less than 2% to less than 5%.   
  Thus, it is only with respect to religious fractionalization that the sensitivity of small 
states’ migrants is substantially greater than that for other countries.  
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
 
4.  THE SMALL STATE PUZZLE 
Even though small states lose a larger proportion of their skilled labor force, the 
correlation between human capital indicators and country size is close to zero (the regression 
coefficient is positive but not significantly different from zero). This implies that the average 
level of education small states generate is higher than in other countries. 
Why would education be higher in small states?  
  12•  Easterly and Kraay (1999) found that, controlling for location, smaller states actually 
have a higher per capita GDP than other states. Lower liquidity constraints might 
explain why young people invest more in education in small states. 
•  Small states might have more generous education policies and/or benefit from the 
outsourcing of education given their geographical and linguistic proximity with large 
and rich developed countries (e.g., between Caribbean countries and the USA, and 
between Pacific islands and both Australia and New Zealand). 
•  Skilled migration prospects raise the return to education and result in a brain gain, i.e., 
in additional investment in education (Beine et al. 2001, 2007). Estimates by Beine et 
al (2007) suggest that the brain gain is equal to about half the brain drain in small 
developing states, so that the actual (net) loss of human capital is equal to only half the 
brain drain level. This means that the proportion of educated would be 20 to 30 
percent higher in small states in the absence of the brain drain. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
The analysis provided in this paper has shown that small states are the main losers 
from the brain drain because of the negative impact of country size, the additional positive 
impact of being a small state, and because of the skilled migrants’ greater sensitivity to 
standard push factors. Unfortunately, there seem to be few policy options available that can 
help seriously dampen the extent of the brain drain. One option source countries might want 
to consider is the formation of cooperative arrangements with their principal destination 
countries, including agreements on return, and possibly circular, migration.    
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  15Table 1: Emigration rates (%) by country group 
 
     2000   








Small States (pop < 1.5 
million) 
46 43.2  15.3  2.81 
          by population size        
Population from 0 to 0.5 million  32 41.7  21.0  2.0 
Population from 0.5 to 1 million  8 47.2  15.7  3.0 
Population from 1 to 1.5 million  6 40.9  9.8  4.2 
         by region / income        
East Asia and Pacific  12 50.8  17.0  3.0 
Latin America and Caribbean  10 74.9  35.0  2.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa  10 41.7  6.0  6.9 
High-income countries  12 23.0  10.7  2.1 
 
Other Groups of Interest 
      
Small Islands Developing States  37 42.4  13.8  3.1 
Population from 1.5 to 3 million  15 20.9  7.1  3.0 
Population from 3 to 4 million  13 18.5  10.0  1.8 
World average  192 5.3  1.8  3.0 
Total high-income countries  41 3.5  2.8  1.3 
Total developing countries  151 7.4  1.5  4.9 
Skilled (average) emigration rates and average emigration rates m are defined as number of skilled (all) 
migrants divided by the sum of skilled (all) migrants. 
Schooling gap = Skilled emigration rate/Average emigration rate. 
Source : Docquier and Marfouk (2006). 
 
  16Table 2: Determinants of the total emigration rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log population size  -0.258 -0.266 -0.237 -0.254 
  (2.78)*** (3.02)*** (3.52)*** (4.98)*** 
Log GDP per capita  5.888 6.141 6.071 8.422 
  (5.34)*** (5.59)*** (5.59)*** (7.40)*** 
Log GDP per capita squared  -0.335 -0.350 -0.349 -0.503 
  (4.88)*** (5.11)*** (5.15)*** (7.02)*** 
Oil exporting dummy  -0.406 -0.336     
  (1.18) (0.97)     
      
Violation of property rights  0.546 0.504 0.528 0.424 
  (2.90)*** (2.70)*** (2.86)*** (3.00)*** 
Political stability  -0.273 -0.277     
  (1.27) (1.29)     
Government effectiveness  0.750 0.725 0.575 0.688 
  (2.62)*** (2.55)**  (2.45)** (3.71)*** 
Religious fractionalization  0.348 0.435 0.448 0.599 
  (0.83) (1.03) (1.07)  (1.92)* 
      
Linguistic links  0.721 0.679 0.755 0.649 
  (3.25)*** (3.08)*** (3.53)*** (4.10)*** 
Log distance from OECD  -0.602 -0.594 -0.608 -0.662 
  (5.76)*** (5.70)*** (5.89)*** (8.34)*** 
Former colony of OECD country  0.308 0.340 0.337 0.228 
  (1.20) (1.37) (1.41) (1.24) 
Year 2000  0.328 0.332 0.331 0.293 
  (6.85)*** (6.97)*** (7.09)***  (2.04)** 
      
Small states (<1.5)  0.647      
  (1.68)      
Large states (>40)  -0.015 -0.018     
  (0.07) (0.08)     
Small states A (from 0 to .5)   1.000  0.988  1.027 
   (1.96)**  (2.06)**  (2.92)*** 
Small states B (from .5  to 1.5)   0.052    
   (0.22)    
Constant  -23.353 -24.188 -24.251 -31.827 
  (5.14)*** (5.28)*** (5.37)*** (6.99)*** 
      
No. of Observations  285  285  285  285 
No. of Countries  153  153  153  153 
R-squared  0.51 0.52 0.51 0.52 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
Columns (1) to (3): panel random effects estimation; column (4): Pooled Least Squares estimation 
  17Table 3: Determinants of the skilled emigration rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log population size   -0.191 -0.220 -0.208 -0.246 
  (1.94)* (2.32)**  (2.95)***  (4.56)*** 
Log GDP per capita  4.980 5.288 4.454 4.352 
  (4.07)*** (4.31)*** (3.70)*** (3.78)*** 
Log GDP per capita squared  -0.311 -0.329 -0.272 -0.274 
  (4.07)*** (4.29)*** (3.65)*** (3.83)*** 
Oil exporting dummy  -0.457 -0.398     
  (1.31) (1.13)     
      
Violation of property rights  0.554 0.497 0.148 0.100 
  (2.91)*** (2.63)***  (0.99)  (0.78) 
Political stability  -0.366 -0.366     
  (1.69)* (1.69)*     
Government effectiveness  0.991 0.946     
  (3.39)*** (3.25)***     
Religious fractionalization  0.910 0.982 1.070 1.184 
  (2.16)** (2.31)** (2.45)**  (3.58)*** 
      
Linguistic links  0.826 0.766 0.831 0.700 
  (3.69)*** (3.44)*** (3.71)*** (4.18)*** 
Log distance from OECD  -0.387 -0.379 -0.463 -0.465 
  (3.66)*** (3.58)*** (4.37)*** (5.59)*** 
Former colony of OECD country  0.935 1.007 1.013 0.763 
  (3.60)*** (3.98)*** (4.01)*** (3.92)*** 
Year 2000  0.217 0.225 0.196 0.077 
  (3.79)*** (3.92)*** (3.53)***  (0.51) 
      
Small states (<1.5)  1.013      
  (2.50)**      
Large states (>40)  -0.169 -0.145     
  (0.65) (0.56)     
Small states A (from 0 to .5)   1.179  1.035  1.024 
   (2.25)**  (2.06)**  (2.75)*** 
Small states B (from .5  to 1.5)   0.308    
   (1.12)    
Constant  -18.906 -19.633 -15.379 -13.329 
  (3.77)*** (3.87)*** (3.13)*** (2.90)*** 
      
No. of Observations  285  285  285  285 
No. of Countries  153  153  153  153 
R-squared  0.41 0.42 0.36 0.37 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
*significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Columns (1) to (3): panel random effects estimation; column (4): Pooled Least Squares estimation 
  18Table 4: Determinants of the skilled emigration rate (after age 22) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log population size  -0.189 -0.213 -0.206 -0.239 
  (2.00)** (2.34)**  (3.05)***  (4.63)*** 
Log GDP per capita  4.731 5.019 4.216 4.075 
  (4.01)*** (4.24)*** (3.62)*** (3.70)*** 
Log GDP per capita squared  -0.301 -0.318 -0.262 -0.263 
  (4.08)*** (4.29)*** (3.64)*** (3.83)*** 
Oil exporting dummy  -0.446 -0.391     
  (1.34) (1.16)     
      
Violation of property rights  0.510 0.455 0.124 0.067 
  (2.81)*** (2.52)**  (0.86)  (0.54) 
Political stability  -0.392 -0.392     
  (1.89)* (1.90)*     
Government effectiveness  0.976 0.931     
  (3.49)*** (3.35)***     
Religious fractionalization  0.953 1.020 1.103 1.191 
  (2.37)** (2.52)**  (2.63)***  (3.76)*** 
      
Linguistic links  0.704 0.645 0.715 0.597 
  (3.30)*** (3.04)*** (3.33)*** (3.73)*** 
Distance from OECD (in log)  -0.388 -0.380 -0.459 -0.459 
  (3.83)*** (3.76)*** (4.52)*** (5.76)*** 
Former colony of OECD country  0.813 0.882 0.902 0.667 
  (3.27)*** (3.65)*** (3.73)*** (3.58)*** 
Year 2000  0.220 0.227 0.199 0.097 
  (3.92)*** (4.04)*** (3.66)***  (0.67) 
      
Small states (<1.5)  1.018      
  (2.63)***      
Large states (>40)  -0.173 -0.152     
  (0.69) (0.60)     
Small states A (from 0 to .5)   1.181  0.998  1.000 
   (2.36)**  (2.07)**  (2.80)*** 
Small states B (from .5 to 1.5)   0.371    
   (1.39)    
Constant  -17.699 -18.405 -14.290 -12.160 
  (3.66)*** (3.76)*** (3.01)*** (2.76)*** 
      
No. of Observations  285  285  285  285 
No. of Countries  153  153  153  153 
R-squared  0.41 0.42 0.36 0.37 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
Columns (1) to (3): panel random effects estimation; column (4): Pooled Least Squares estimation 
  19Table 5: Determinants of various emigration rates 
(with interaction of country size and fractionalization) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Total  Skilled  Skill 22+  Total  Skilled  Skill 22+ 
Log Population  -0.222  -0.194  -0.200 -0.244 -0.213 -0.215 
  (3.43)***  (2.99)***  (3.18)*** (5.05)*** (4.33)*** (4.53)*** 
Log GDP per capita   5.442  4.245  3.956 6.823 4.054 3.708 
  (5.40)***  (3.56)***  (3.41)*** (6.67)*** (3.79)*** (3.59)*** 
Log GDP per capita sq  -0.312  -0.262  -0.249 -0.399 -0.258 -0.241 
  (5.12)***  (3.67)***  (3.58)*** (6.48)*** (4.05)*** (3.91)*** 
Oil exporting dummy  -0.562  -0.724  -0.681 -0.560 -0.706 -0.665 
  (1.69)* (2.15)**  (2.10)**  (2.33)**  (2.85)***  (2.78)*** 
          
Religious fractionalization  0.070  0.632  0.698 0.194 0.700 0.742 
  (0.16) (1.44)  (1.65)*  (0.59)  (2.10)**  (2.30)** 
Relig. fract. x Small states  1.929  1.727  1.505 1.792 1.865 1.652 
  (3.09)***  (2.65)***  (2.40)**  (3.83)*** (3.77)*** (3.46)*** 
Linguistic  0.678  0.687  0.585 0.592 0.599 0.510 
  (3.26)***  (3.24)***  (2.87)*** (3.81)*** (3.75)*** (3.31)*** 
Distance  -0.575  -0.412  -0.411 -0.642 -0.429 -0.423 
  (5.74)***  (3.85)***  (3.98)*** (7.88)*** (5.10)*** (5.21)*** 
          
Year2000  0.320  0.154  0.155 0.254 0.055 0.069 
  (7.65)*** (2.63)***  (2.67)***  (1.82)*  (0.38)  (0.51) 
Former colony   1.035  0.933    0.794  0.712 
   (4.07)***  (3.81)***    (4.08)***  (3.79)*** 
Constant  -20.127  -14.143  -12.872 -24.552 -12.179 -10.834 
  (4.84)***  (2.87)***  (2.69)*** (5.91)*** (2.78)***  (2.56)** 
          
No.  of  Observations  310  310  310 310 310 310 
No.  of  Countries  166  166  166 166 166 166 
R-squared  0.55  0.45  0.43 0.54 0.46 0.44 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
Columns (1) to (3): panel random effects estimation; column (4) to (6): Pooled Least Squares estimation 
  20Table 6:  Determinants of various emigration rates  
(with interaction of country size and GDP per capita) 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  Total Skilled  Skill  22+ Total Skilled  Skill  22+ 
Log population  -0.192 -0.189  -0.184  -0.276 -0.226 -0.215 
  (2.48)**  (2.53)**  (2.57)**  (4.97)*** (4.02)*** (3.98)*** 
GDP per capita   5.578 4.729  4.365  7.605 4.891 4.420 
  (5.58)*** (4.00)***  (3.81)***  (7.49)*** (4.67)*** (4.39)*** 
GDP per capita sq.  -0.321 -0.291  -0.274  -0.445 -0.307 -0.283 
  (5.30)*** (4.10)***  (3.98)***  (7.27)*** (4.90)*** (4.69)*** 
GDP per cap x small  0.122 0.093  0.090  0.067 0.083 0.083 
  (2.78)***  (2.08)** (2.10)** (2.16)**  (2.48)**  (2.58)** 
          
Oil export  -0.484 -0.651  -0.614  -0.483 -0.638 -0.601 
  (1.35)  (1.88)*  (1.85)*  (1.98)** (2.54)** (2.49)** 
Religious fractionalization  0.510 1.041  1.058  0.651 1.163 1.154 
  (1.14)  (2.44)** (2.59)*** (2.11)**  (3.67)***  (3.79)*** 
Linguistic  0.674 0.680  0.583  0.568 0.574 0.492 
  (2.99)*** (3.13)***  (2.80)***  (3.60)*** (3.55)*** (3.17)*** 
Distance  -0.567 -0.406  -0.407  -0.630 -0.424 -0.420 
  (5.32)*** (3.71)***  (3.87)***  (7.60)*** (4.97)*** (5.12)*** 
          
Year2000  0.314 0.154  0.154  0.250 0.051 0.065 
  (7.83)*** (2.67)***  (2.68)***  (1.75)*  (0.35)  (0.47) 
Former colony   1.039  0.920   0.837  0.732 
   (3.91)***  (3.60)***   (4.18)***  (3.80)*** 
Constant  -21.378 -16.441  -14.960  -27.558 -15.700 -13.974 
  (5.09)*** (3.33)***  (3.12)***  (6.56)*** (3.61)*** (3.34)*** 
          
No.  of  Observations  310 310  310  310 310 310 
No.  of  Countries  166 166  166  166 166 166 
R-squared  0.51 0.45  0.44  0.53 0.44 0.43 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
Columns (1) to (3): panel random effects estimation; column (4) to (6): Pooled Least Squares estimation 
  21Table 7: Determinants of various emigration rates 
(with interaction of country size and squared per capita GDP) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
  Total  Skilled Skill  22+  Total  Skilled Skill  22+ 
Log population  -0.165 -0.176 -0.173  -0.274  -0.225 -0.214 
  (2.22)** (2.40)** (2.45)** (4.95)*** (4.02)***  (3.97)*** 
GDP per capita   5.682 4.802 4.437  7.687  4.999 4.527 
  (5.73)*** (4.09)*** (3.89)***  (7.58)***  (4.79)*** (4.52)*** 
GDP per capita sq.  -0.330 -0.297 -0.280  -0.450  -0.314 -0.290 
  (5.49)*** (4.20)*** (4.08)***  (7.36)***  (5.02)*** (4.82)*** 
GDP squared x small  0.016 0.012 0.011  0.008  0.009 0.009 
  (3.47)***  (2.39)**  (2.40)** (2.23)** (2.54)**  (2.65)*** 
          
Oil export  -0.484 -0.651 -0.615  -0.488  -0.646 -0.608 
  (1.37) (1.89)*  (1.86)* (2.01)**  (2.58)**  (2.52)** 
Religious fractionalization  0.519 1.051 1.067  0.656  1.167 1.159 
  (1.18)  (2.48)**  (2.62)*** (2.12)** (3.69)***  (3.81)*** 
Linguistic  0.688 0.690 0.592  0.570  0.575 0.494 
  (3.10)*** (3.18)*** (2.85)***  (3.61)***  (3.56)*** (3.18)*** 
Distance  -0.586 -0.410 -0.411  -0.629  -0.424 -0.420 
  (5.55)*** (3.76)*** (3.92)***  (7.60)***  (4.97)*** (5.12)*** 
          
Year2000  0.310 0.151 0.151  0.248  0.049 0.063 
  (7.77)*** (2.62)*** (2.63)***  (1.74)*  (0.34)  (0.46) 
Former colony    1.022 0.904    0.845 0.738 
    (3.87)*** (3.57)***    (4.25)*** (3.86)*** 
Constant  -21.911 -16.807 -15.320  -27.902  -16.135 -14.410 
  (5.25)*** (3.40)*** (3.20)***  (6.62)***  (3.71)*** (3.45)*** 
          
No.  of  Observation  310 310 310  310  310 310 
No  of  Countries  166 166 166  166  166 166 
R-squared  0.51 0.44 0.43  0.53  0.44 0.43 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
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1 A similar work can be found in Dumont and Lemaître (2005) who provide emigration rates 
for about 100 countries in 2000. The correlation between Docquier-Marfouk's and Dumont-
Lemaître's estimates varies between 91 percent and 88 percent depending on the human 
capital indicators used for residents. 
2 Mexican-born individuals who arrived in the US at age 5 or 10 and then graduated from US 
high-education institutions later on are counted as high-skill Mexican immigrants. 
3 At some point, the impact becomes negative, i.e., further increases in per capita income 
reduce migration rates.  Even if the income differential with host countries remains constant, 
as income increases, the marginal value of living in one’s culture and with one’s friends and 
family rises relative to that of income.  This provides another reason for the reduction in 
migration rates. 
4 This may be due to the fact that greater government effectiveness is also likely to i) promote 
trade, which is likely to require source country individuals to live temporarily abroad (such as 
under Mode IV of the GATS); and ii) result in lower costs of obtaining the documents 
required to leave the country, and the lower migration costs might result in an increase in the 
emigration of financially constrained individuals.  
 